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Crises, Contagion, and Coordination:
A Summary of the 2002 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum
John Murray, Urban Bäckstrom, Robert Parry, and Anthony Santomero
On November 22, 2002, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
held its second annual Philadelphia
Fed Policy Forum, "Crises, Contagion,
and Coordination: Issues for
Policymakers in the Global Economy."
This event, sponsored by the Bank's
Research Department, brought
together a group of highly respected
academics, policymakers, and market
economists, for discussion and debate
about issues monetary policymakers
must grapple with in our increasingly
global economy.  The Policy Forum
was not intended to be a traditional
academic conference on monetary
policy, nor was it intended to be a
discussion of issues relevant to the
next FOMC meeting.  Rather, we took
a longer-term perspective and tried to
engage the right people in a discussion
of current economic research and its
implications for monetary policy.  Our
hope is that the 2002 Policy Forum is
a catalyst for both greater understand-
ing of today's global economy and
more critical thinking about the role
of policymakers in that global world.
National economies are
linked through trade in goods and
services, cross-border flows of finan-
cial assets, and labor migration.  Eco-
nomic integration strengthens these ties.
Reduction of trade barriers, financial
innovations, and advances in communi-
cations and information flows have
increased integration.  Participants at the
Policy Forum discussed a number of
issues that policymakers must confront in
our increasingly interdependent world:
the importance of institutional arrange-
ments in maximizing the benefits of
economic and financial linkages, the
factors that foment crises and foster
contagion, the actions policymakers can
take to prevent and contain crises, and
the question of whether policy should
be coordinated (or not).  We were
reminded that policymakers' actions
affect incentives: the actions a policy-
maker takes to ameliorate a crisis may
set up conditions that raise the likelihood
or the cost of the next crisis.  We were
also reminded that while globalization
has increased the level of interrelation-
ship among economies and markets,
financial crises and contagion are not
new: they have characterized economies
far into the past.
Anthony M. Santomero,
president of the Philadelphia Fed,
began the day by pointing out that as
economies and financial systems
around the globe have become more
closely integrated, political and
economic events abroad can have
important economic implications at
home.   Policymakers must learn to
cope with the challenges faced by
globalization because it is here to stay.
Economists recognize the benefits to
national economies that globalization
offers: the promise of higher returns and
a lower variance in economic perfor-  Business Review  Q3  2003   9 www.phil.frb.org
1 Many of the presentations reviewed here are
available on our web site at www.phil.frb.org/
conf/policyforum2002.html.
mance than any one country could
achieve on its own, the promise of more
rapid output growth and higher living
standards via greater exploitation of
specialization and comparative advan-
tage, and the promise of better diversifi-
cation of financial risks.  But at the same
time, globalization has its shortcomings:
greater potential for contagion and
spread of economic and financial
problems and reduced potency of
domestic policy.
In Santomero's view, on
balance, globalization is a strong
positive for national economies.
Policymakers can maximize the
benefits and minimize the costs of
global integration by creating infra-
structures that allow markets to
function efficiently, to contain the
system in times of crisis, and to control
the impact of cyclical fluctuations.
Efficiency is fostered by having a legal
system that establishes property rights
and enforces contracts, and regulation
that provides the basis for a well-
functioning financial system.
Policymakers should act to stabilize
cyclical fluctuations and take actions
that not only stabilize financial systems
in time of crisis but are time consis-
tent, so that they do not create
expectations that deepen or even
precipitate a crisis tomorrow.
Santomero emphasized that the
overarching question for policymakers
as they act to strengthen markets,
avoid and contain crises, and dampen
business-cycle fluctuations is the
degree to which effective performance
requires international coordination of
activities.  This issue was taken up
later in the day.
FINANCIAL CRISES1
I had the pleasure of moder-
ating the first session, which addressed
several questions that emerged through-
out the rest of the day as well.  Are
crises the inevitable consequence of
globalization?  If so, what, if anything,
can policymakers do to lower the
probability that a crisis will occur?  What
can policymakers do to limit the extent
and lower the costs of a crisis once it
occurs?  The session's papers under-
scored the importance of recognizing
that institutional arrangements can lead
to actions that exacerbate moral hazard
problems and the need to focus on
policies that are time consistent.
Indeed, the design of the institution,
including its objective function, has
important effects on feasible outcomes.
For me, the session under-
scored the fact that policymakers often
face a tradeoff between the short-run
benefits of their action — namely,
stemming the crisis and avoiding lost
output — versus its longer run cost that
could arise if the institution distorts the
incentives of financial markets.  An
important issue is whether institutions
can be designed to give policymakers
the incentive to avoid the temptation of
going for the short-run benefits despite
their long-run cost.  Another important
issue is the measurement of these costs
and benefits.  In the midst of a crisis,
how can the policymaker be sure what
that tradeoff is? If intervention succeeds
in stemming a crisis, it is difficult to
measure the long-run costs implicit in
taking the action — the cost of
incentive distortion.  Crisis situations are
often characterized by coordination
failures.  What determines whether
such a coordinator will emerge?
V .V . Chari of the University
of Minnesota began his presentation
by reviewing some of the recent
research on financial crises.  In Chari's
view, the central feature of the data on
financial crises in emerging markets is
that when a crisis hits there are substan-
tial swings in capital and output.  When
times are good, capital flows strongly
into the country.  During a crisis, capital
starts flowing out dramatically, so that
there is a sharp swing in the current
account.  Similarly, output growth turns
into contraction at the time of the crisis.
One theory consistent with the
data is coordination failure among
debtors: if a debtholder fears that the
government will default on its debt if
other debtholders choose to not roll
over the country's debt, then it's
rational for the first debtholder not to
roll over the debt either. Even though
all debtholders would be better off if
they agreed to the rollover (since
default would be avoided), the fact
that they cannot coordinate leads to a
worse outcome for all.
Another theory consistent
with the data involves herd behavior.
There are a number of players that
might contemplate investing in an
emerging market, for example,
investment banks or mutual funds, and
each has its own information on which
to base its decision.  If one small group
decides not to invest or withdraws its
investment, the others might be
deterred from investing too, reasoning
that the first group might have some
important, negative information.  That
is, the investors move in herds, which
can result in capital flight.  Note that
this can happen even if the inference
is incorrect: it could be that if the
information of all the players was
aggregated, it would show that
investing in the country is profitable.
These theories share some
common elements: there is the
possibility the government will default;
debtholders may fear they may be
expropriated; and debtholders'
property rights are insecure.  Chari
draws three conclusions.  (1) Crises are
here to stay, since these common
elements are inherent in the process of
emerging markets striving to become10   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
2 In the question-and-answer period, Charles
Goodhart of the London School of Economics
said he believes Chari overstates the extent of
possible central bank coordination to handle
crises. Goodhart, who was on the British
monetary policy committee in 1998, said that to
his knowledge, there was no policy coordina-
tion in 1998.
more developed.  (2) Some mechanism
for restructuring and renegotiating
sovereign debt in the event of a default
or a threatened default, a so-called
international bankruptcy court, can
serve a useful social role, since it
reduces the possibility of expropriation
of some debtors by others.  (3) Current
direct lending policies of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) that
involve lending to countries when they
are threatened with a crisis are socially
harmful because they mean debt-
holders don't monitor the debt as much
as they would if there were no possibility
for a bailout.
Chari explains why, in his
view, the logic for having a domestic
lender of last resort does not carry
through to the international context.
The logic for a domestic lender of last
resort depends on the inherent fragility
of the banking system: banks lend long
but borrow short.  This mismatch of
maturities on their balance sheets
creates a coordination problem: if
enough depositors start to withdraw
their funds, others find it in their
interest to withdraw as well, causing
the bank to fail. If that failure is
contagious, other banks might fail, too.
The lender of last resort can stem the
systemic failures of banks that would
be healthy if they were not experienc-
ing heavy withdrawals.
In the international context,
governments do not have to have
mismatched assets and liabilities to
carry on their functions; hence, in
Chari's view, an international lender of
last resort that would choose which
countries to bail out is not necessary.
Rather, in the event of a threatened
financial crisis, it would be important
to provide liquidity to the entire
financial system.  Chari argues that the
appropriate institutions for providing this
liquidity already exist: central banks.
Moreover, the central banks have
already shown they are able to coordi-
nate in this fashion as evidenced by
their response during the Russian debt
default, when the central banks of the
major powers coordinated on interest
rate cuts.2
Hyun Song Shin of the
London School of Economics contin-
ued the discussion by drawing some
analogies between a seldom-described
crisis that occurred in Europe in 1763
and the LTCM crisis of 1998 for the
purpose of extracting some policy
lessons.  Many commentators have
emphasized the failure of sophisticated
risk-management methods in precipi-
tating the 1998 financial crisis, but as
Shin points out, many of the themes
are actually very old and already
present in the crisis of 1763 — namely,
liquidity risk and aggregate risk.
He used London's Millen-
nium Bridge to illustrate the problem
of aggregate risk. On opening day,
thousands of people were walking
across the bridge to christen it when a
gust of wind started the bridge
swaying.  As the people tried to
balance themselves, this caused the
bridge to sway even more, which
caused the people to rebalance
themselves, which caused more
swaying, and so on, and a bad feedback
loop was created.  The bridge had to
be shut down for 18 months for
repairs. The engineers discovered that
the bridge swayed violently if people
all walked at the same cadence, and
the rebalancing mimicked this
cadence.  Should the designers have
taken this into account?  The odds of a
thousand random people walking in
step are extremely small, but once the
wind started, the people were not
walking at random. Their steps were
no longer random events.
The analogy to the LTCM
crisis is apparent. The hedge fund
LTCM matched a long position with a
short position in a very similar asset
and made a gain on the very slight
difference in returns.  By leveraging
this many, many times, the fund could
make a high return.  Other firms
copied very similar trading strategies.
When a shock hit, the funds had to
unwind leveraged positions to meet
margin calls, which moved prices
against everyone that had a very
similar trading position, which caused
more distress, which led to more
margin calls, and so on.  In Shin's view,
it is incorrect to think that LTCM was
just unlucky.  Far from a probability of
zero, collapse was a near certainty,
given the right conditions.  When
there is aggregate risk, it is not possible
for everyone to hedge away their risk;
someone has to be holding the residual
risk.
In the 1700s, the Netherlands
was a preeminent trading nation in
Europe. It was capital rich but had
very few investment opportunities.
Prussia was an emerging market
hungry for capital. Trade was facili-
tated using bills of exchange, which
enabled a string of interconnected
obligations that mimicked a loan from
Amsterdam to Berlin. But these linked
the balance sheets of the merchants
and bankers involved. Everyone's
liability was exactly matched by a
claim on someone else; that is, everyone
had a perfectly hedged book. But this
meant there was substantial liquidity
risk: when a shock hit one claimant, it
affected all.
Such a shock hit in 1763 when
the Seven Years War ended, causing the
price of war goods to decline. As
collateral values fell, banks became
distressed.  Merchants' asset values fell.  Business Review  Q3  2003   11 www.phil.frb.org
They needed to sell more of their assets
to meet their obligations, and this
caused prices to fall even more, creating
a negative feedback effect. Banks
began to fail in Amsterdam, then in
Hamburg.  Because of the web of
linkages, the crisis spread to Berlin,
Stockholm, and Russia, resulting in a
massive number of bank failures.  The
crisis of 1763 involved aggregate risk:
counterparty risk was correlated with
credit risk.  The crisis of 1763 also
involved liquidity risk.  Instead of the
usual banking story in which distress is
transmitted across banks via their
liabilities (deposit withdrawals), here
there was asset-side contagion: as asset
prices fell, other traders got into
distress.
In Shin's view, one lesson
from the crises of 1763 and LTCM is
that we need to take endogenous risk
seriously.  While we need to refine our
mathematical methods and statistical
techniques to extract the most
information we can from past data, we
also have to think about how all the
interested parties are interlinked.
Relying on past data, no matter how
sophisticated the statistical methods, is
not going to capture the correct
prediction.  When push comes to
shove, historic correlations break
down and credit risk and counterparty
risk will suddenly strike together.  Risk
is inherent in the system as a whole, so
we need to take aggregate risk seri-
ously: it is not possible for everyone to
hedge themselves perfectly.  When the
economy itself has risk, someone has
to bear that risk somewhere; the
question then becomes, who should
bear that risk?  Shin also underscored
the importance of coordination, a
theme in Chari's work and an important
difference between the LTCM crisis and
the crisis of 1763.  The New York Fed
acted as a coordinator of the creditors in
the LTCM crisis.  In contrast, no entity
played the role of coordinator in the





The next session focused on
the causes of contagion and how crises
spread across regions of the world.
Franklin Allen of the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania,
discussed how different institutional
arrangements, in particular central
bank and financial system arrange-
ments, can affect the probability of
contagion when financial systems are
not fully integrated.  Allen pointed out
that most central banks today have a
dual mandate of price stability and
financial system stability.  An excep-
tion is the European Central Bank
(ECB), whose single goal is price
stability. Financial stability is the
responsibility of the national central
banks in Europe. In Allen's view, this
arrangement poses several problems. It
precludes using monetary policy for
financial stability aims. It makes it
difficult to coordinate responses to a
problem that starts in the banks in one
European country but that could
potentially spread to other countries.
It makes it more difficult to handle
contagion, since a national central
bank may not internalize the problems
contagion causes in other countries.
Allen's paper demonstrates
the tradeoff between price stability and
financial stability.  Consider a world
without contagion. Banks generally
lend long and borrow short. If asset
values fall, banks may find they have
to liquidate assets early and take fire-
sale losses in order to meet their
obligations.  A central bank can stave
off the need for costly liquidations if it
lends to the banking system.  The
money injection allows banks to meet
their nominal obligations, and it also
lowers the price level. In this case,
financial stability and monetary stability
are inconsistent.  An alternative way to
stem the panic is through fiscal policy:
increase taxes on individuals and give
the proceeds to the banks.  In this case,
financial stability and monetary stability
are consistent.
But now consider a world
with many regions whose banking
systems are interlinked, and there is
the possibility of contagion. Interbank
markets and flexible exchange rates
allow for risks — both asset risk and
liquidity risk — to be shared across
countries. But they also allow for the
propagation of problems from one
country's banking system to others if
there is aggregate risk.  If the central
bank has the right incentives, it can
correctly estimate the costs and benefits
of intervening to stem the contagion.  In
Allen's view, the Euroland system does
not have those correct incentives
because: (1) the ECB, having responsi-
bility only for price stability and not
financial stability, cannot use monetary
policy to ensure financial stability, and
(2) the national central banks will
pursue policies in their own national
interests rather than in the interests of
the whole group of nations; the cost-
benefit calculation for intervening will
be different from that for the whole
group, which will lead to inefficient
decision making.
Allen proposes that one way to
solve this problem is to give the ECB the
dual mandate of price stability and
financial stability.  In his view, at the
present low levels of inflation that
prevail in Europe, the cost of the
inflation that would result from using
monetary policy to stem a financial crisis
would be less than the cost of a financial
crisis. He also notes that the fixed
exchange rate in Europe causes a large
part of the problem.  Flexible exchange
rates would help stem contagion as long
as domestic banks' liabilities are in
domestic currency.  A devaluation of12   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Kenneth Rogoff
the currency would allow banks to meet
their liabilities and avoid costly liquida-
tion of assets.  Fiscal intervention could
also solve the problem, but only if a
single tax to bail out banks is levied
across all the countries; this would entail
coordination problems.
In Allen's view, a single
currency area, such as the Euroland,
that has separation of fiscal and
monetary responsibilities has the
potential problem of contagion: a small
shock in one place can become a big
problem everywhere.  He urged that the
creation of an integrated financial
system in the Euro area be hastened,
since that would ensure risk sharing
across countries and financial stability
from monetary policy or fiscal inter-
vention in the same way as when there
is a single country.
If we are to devise policies
and institutions to try to prevent this
type of contagion and systemic crises,
it is important to know the causes of
contagion and the channels through
which a shock in one country can spill
over and be transmitted to others.
Graciela Kaminsky of George Wash-
ington University reviewed some of her
recent work in this area, examining
spillovers that occur in a matter of days
or hours in countries with established
financial systems. Kaminsky used daily
data on stock market returns in
the 1990s to measure turmoil as
stock market returns in the tail of
the distribution. Thus, very large
decreases or declines in stock
returns that occur in countries on
the same day are evidence of
spillovers.  Kaminsky's results
suggest that spillovers have
regional characteristics.  There
was spillover across the countries
of Asia in 1997, but not later in
the 1990s.  There was no spillover
of turmoil from Asia to Europe in
1997, but in 1998, the sharp
movements in the stock markets
of Europe occurred on the same days.
In Latin America, there were spillovers
across countries in early 1999.  Some-
times spillovers are worldwide, as they
were in the fall of 1998.  Often, when a
financial-center country, for example,
the U.S. or Germany, experiences
turmoil, it is transmitted to the rest of
the world.  Problems occur synchro-
nously in many emerging markets but
generally only when a shock in one of
them first influences a financial center.
In looking at crises over the
past 200 years, Kaminsky noted (as
had Chari earlier) that crises that entail
contagion generally are preceded by a
surge in capital flows. Once the shock
hits, there is a sudden reversal of capital
flows, then the crisis spreads through the
world. Contagion does not occur when
there is no activity in international
financial markets or when there is a
small amount of international lending.
Kaminsky distinguishes crises
that are anticipated from those that
are a surprise.  The damage is much
larger from an unanticipated crisis
because there is no time for lenders to
rebalance their portfolios ahead of the
crisis.  The crises in Mexico, Thailand,
and Russia were not anticipated: these
countries' sovereign debt had not been
downgraded by Standard and Poor's in
the 12 months before the crisis, and
some were even upgraded. In contrast,
the crises in Brazil, Turkey, and
Argentina were anticipated: their debt
was downgraded consistently in the
months going into the crisis. This
allowed investors and creditors to
hedge some of their risk and scale back
their exposure, thereby limiting the
damage.
In Kaminsky's view, there is
no clear solution to contagion and
spillovers that happen very quickly.
One can impose controls on capital





Our third session concerned
policy coordination and appropriate
monetary policy in a crisis, a theme
that ran through the first two sessions.
In a world in which goods and
financial markets are becoming
increasingly interlinked, are problems
created when each country sets its own
monetary policy?  Are stabilization
gains from having separate currencies
dissipated if monetary policies are not
coordinated?  According to Kenneth
Rogoff of the International Monetary
Fund and Harvard University, the
answer is no. Rogoff's research suggests
that, in most cases, the gains from
monetary policy coordination are
relatively small compared with the
gains obtained if each central bank
pursues an optimal monetary policy for
macroeconomic stabilization in its
respective country. That is, typically, the
biggest gains are from getting your own
house in order. Although the gains to
international policy coordination would
not be that large among the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan, little research has
been done on the spillover effects to the
rest of the world.  For example, ex-
change rate volatility does not have first-
order effects on these three areas, but it  Business Review  Q3  2003   13 www.phil.frb.org Martin Eichenbaum
could be significant to the rest of the
world.
 Rogoff emphasized that one
cannot meaningfully discuss interna-
tional monetary coordination in the
absence of the underlying fiscal policy
framework in the countries in ques-
tion. Monetary policy cannot cure all
the problems caused by poor fiscal
policy, and a poor fiscal situation can
limit the effectiveness of monetary
policy. He notes that the welfare
effects of alternative policies will differ,
depending on the underlying distor-
tions in the economy, for example,
wage rigidities or nonoptimal tax
systems. In closing, Rogoff pointed out
that the exchange of ideas among
central bankers, which one might
characterize as a type of coordination,
is valuable, since countries often face
similar economic problems and issues.
Martin Eichenbaum of
Northwestern University continued
the discussion of the links between
monetary and fiscal policy, focusing on
the fiscal implications of banking and
currency crises, the so-called twin
crises. According to the classical view,
currency crises arise when the govern-
ment prints money to finance ongoing
or prospective government deficits.
These prospective government deficits
might be caused by the costs of
resolving a banking crisis, which can
be very large.  For example, the
resolution costs of the Indonesian
banking crisis have been estimated at
over 60 percent of Indonesia's GDP .
Indeed, three effects can raise the costs
of resolving a banking crisis.  A currency
crisis that results in a devaluation of the
country's currency raises the cost of
resolving a banking crisis by reducing
the residual value of banks, which
typically have dollar liabilities and local
currency assets and are unhedged.  In
addition, twin crises are typically
followed by recessions in which tax
revenues fall, exacerbating the fiscal
implications of twin crises. Finally, there
is a relative price effect.  When the local
currency depreciates, the dollar value of
tax receipts falls.  If this drop outweighs
the drop in value of government
spending on nontradable goods, this
worsens the government's fiscal
situation.
But there are two problems
with the classical view of currency
crises.  First, it implies that inflation
rates would be high after a currency
crisis, but in reality, many crises are
followed by moderate inflation rates.
Second, it emphasizes the role of
seignorage as an important source of
government finance, but in reality,
seignorage provides a limited amount
of revenue.
A key insight from
Eichenbaum is that printing money to
generate seignorage is only one of the
ways a government can pay for the
fiscal costs of a twin crisis, and the
method chosen will have implications
for the post-crisis inflation rate. This
recognition allows models of twin crises
to be reconciled with the data.  In
addition to seignorage, the government
could finance a banking system bailout
by using explicit fiscal reform of raising
taxes or cutting spending; deflating the
real value of outstanding nonindexed
nominal debt; using implicit fiscal
reform of reducing the real value of
government transfer commitments (for
example, social security payments) that
aren't fully indexed to foreign
currency; defaulting on outstanding
debt; and/or receiving an interna-
tional bailout.
All of the methods of
paying for the crisis, except for
explicit default or explicit fiscal
reform, require a depreciation of the
currency — the government would
need to abandon a fixed exchange
rate regime to gain access to these
revenues — and they involve some
inflation. But the exact amounts
depend on the mix of financing
strategies used.  If there is a significant
depreciation of the country's currency to
pay for the crisis, the post-crisis inflation
rate need not be as high as when the
country prints money to finance the
costs of resolution.  Eichenbaum
concluded with a case study of the
Korean twin crisis, showing that an
extension of the model to include
various methods of financing allows it to
fit the data.  It remains for future
research to determine what leads
different countries to adopt different
financing strategies and what the
welfare implications of those alternatives
are.
Lawrence Christiano of
Northwestern University turned the
discussion to how a central bank should
manage a financial crisis, such as the
Asian crisis of 1997-98, in which the
value of the country's currency is
collapsing, there's a sharp reversal from
capital inflows to outflows, and the
domestic economy is falling into a
recession.  Consider a country that is
borrowing in domestic currency to pay
for labor and in international markets for
foreign currency to purchase a foreign
intermediate input.  A crisis is triggered
by collateral constraints suddenly
becoming binding: firms need to borrow
but the value of their assets does not
permit them to borrow more.  What's a
central bank to do?14   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
One view, which Christiano
characterized as the Krugman-Stiglitz
view, advocates that the central bank
cut interest rates, since the economy is
falling into a recession. The interest-rate
cut causes a reduction in the real
interest rate used to discount future
flows, so asset prices rise. If asset prices
rise enough, the collateral constraint
becomes less binding, firms can finance
more of the intermediate input, and
output can expand.  An alternative
view, which Christiano characterized as
the IMF view, advocates against cutting
interest rates in order to help stem
capital flight. If the country cuts its
domestic interest rate, its currency will
depreciate and the value of a firm's
assets in foreign currency will fall;
hence, its purchases of the intermediate
input must fall. Production contracts,
and the economy may enter a recession.
Which is correct?  The key is
how asset prices respond to a cut in
interest rates.  Christiano's research
suggests that that depends on how open
the country's economy is, that is, how
flexible its prices and factors of produc-
tion are. Any relaxation in the collateral
constraint makes it easier to bring in the
foreign input, and if it is easy to move
factors around, the foreign input can be
combined with capital and labor and
immediately be put to productive use.
This, in turn, raises asset prices and the
marginal product of capital. In this type
of flexible economy, cutting the
domestic interest rate in the face of a
crisis is the better thing to do. But if the
economy is inflexible, it cannot move its
factors of production around very much,
so the increase in the foreign input,
which occurs when the collateral
constraint is relaxed, cannot be put to
productive use, so asset prices do not
rise.  In this case, cutting rates would be
counterproductive; it would intensify
the capital outflow but not raise asset
values.  Christiano's latest research
suggests that in an economy in which
resources are inflexible in the short run
but flexible in the long run, the optimal
strategy in the face of a crisis is to raise
interest rates in the short run to stem
capital flight but to lower rates in the
long run.  This appears to be what
happens in crisis economies.
POLICYMAKING IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT
Our final session brought
together a panel of international
policymakers to discuss the practical
aspects of implementing monetary
policy in a global context.  Robert
Parry, president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, made the point
that in setting monetary policy, the
Federal Reserve's primary focus is on the
U.S. economy and its goals remain
maximum sustainable output and
employment and price stability.  The
integration of goods and financial
markets has made conditions in other
countries more prominent in the Fed's
deliberations, but for the most part,
the effects on policymaking are at the
margin; globalization has not severed
the connections between monetary
policy and the U.S. economy.
In Parry's view, globalization
has not changed the goals or conduct
of U.S. monetary policy to any great
extent.  This is because foreign events
rarely have a large effect on the U.S.
economy, since: (1) our economy is
large so shocks in foreign economies
matter less for us than for smaller
countries, (2) there is still a substantial
home bias in our demand for goods,
services, and assets, so changes in
foreign demand have only a small effect
on aggregate demand in the U.S., and
(3) our flexible exchange rate regime
allows us to use interest rates to conduct
monetary policy.  But there have been a
few instances when U.S. monetary
policy has responded to foreign develop-
ments, for example, during the global
financial crises of the late 1990s.
Parry also made the point that
growing interdependence of national
economies makes it increasingly
important to pay attention to the actions
of foreign policymakers, and he agreed
with Rogoff that there is value in the
formal and informal meetings that
Federal Reserve staff members have
with the staffs of other central banks
around the world. Such information
exchange enables the Fed to better
forecast global economic conditions that
affect the U.S. economy.  The meetings
also allow officials to get to know one
another so that if an event occurs in
which cooperation is needed, it is easier
to effect.  Parry said that agreements to
coordinate monetary policy actions do
not typically occur at such meetings.
On the other hand, there is a great deal
of coordination of regulatory policy in
financial markets in recognition of the
fact that problems in one country's
financial sector can be quickly transmit-
ted to other countries' financial systems
through debt defaults or contagion.
John Murray, adviser to the
governor of the Bank of Canada,
concurred that running independent
monetary policies across countries has
benefits.  According to Murray, the
Bank of Canada has a skeptical
attitude toward policy coordination,
even though economies have become
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more integrated and there have been a
series of crises.  He agreed with Rogoff
that policy coordination may be good
in concept, but that in practice, it is
better for central bank policymakers to
focus on their own domestic objec-
tives.  This, despite that fact that in
contrast to the U.S., Canada is a small,
open economy.
Canadian monetary policy
operations are guided by three
precepts: the importance of keeping
your own house in order with respect
to price stability and full-employment
growth; the importance of transpar-
ency and credibility to eliminate
unnecessary uncertainty and doubt;
and the importance of a flexible
exchange rate, which helps insulate
the economy from external shocks.  In
periods of extreme instability, interna-
tional coordination may offer some
gain, but in Murray's view, good
domestic policies should help keep
these occurrences to a minimum.
Urban Bäckstrom, governor
of the Central Bank of Sweden,
endorsed Murray's statements and
went on to discuss how central bankers
can go about putting their houses in
order. He believes that central bankers
have made much progress in focusing on
price stability and increasing transpar-
ency and that their next major issue will
be financial stability.  What can
policymakers do to mitigate financial
cycles? As Bäckstrom explained it,
financial cycles would seem to evolve
from excessive optimism: credit
expansion feeds into asset prices,
lowering the cost of capital, which
stimulates investment and leads to an
economic boom. Eventually, the
investments are found not to be
sustainable, since they do not generate
profits, and the structure collapses. The
economy moves from boom to bust, and
there may be banking and/or currency
crises.
Bäckstrom said two conven-
tional pieces of policy advice for central
bankers in preventing financial cycles
are moral suasion and prudential
regulation. Central bank policymakers
might warn market participants they are
becoming overly optimistic in their
expectations about future cash flows.
While such moral suasion may be worth
a try, Bäckstrom is skeptical that a
market can be talked down when it is
rushing to new heights. There are also
problems with prudential regulation.  In
Bäckstrom's view, most financial crises
stem not from individual banks' getting
into difficulties and affecting others by
contagion but from many institutions'
acting similarly. Also, prudential
regulation is based on perceptions of
risk, which are not independent of the
credit and asset-price cycle itself.
Apparent risk declines as collateral
values rise during the upturn in the
cycle, even though actual risk builds
up as the expansion and leverage
continues. Bank supervisors are aware
of this problem and are trying to
address it, but for Bäckstrom, whether
improved prudential regulation,
supervisory practices, and risk-
management techniques will be
enough to avoid financial cycles in the
future is an open question.
Bäckstrom would like
researchers to explore the possible use
of monetary policy in preventing large
financial cycles, noting that price
stability is not, by itself, sufficient to
ensure financial stability.  There is little
to prevent the emergence of cycles in
the prices of real and financial assets
that are not included in the measure of
inflation. He acknowledged that there
are arguments against a central bank's
trying to respond to changes in asset
prices that do not lead to inflation in the
prices of goods and services (for
example, how does the central bank
know that a bubble is a bubble and not a
reflection of fundamentals?) and that a
central bank should not target asset
prices per se.  But he proposed that the
central bank be observant when notable
increases in assets prices are one of
several imbalances building up in the
economy, even when inflation is
contained. Bäckstrom said he consid-
ers the use of monetary policy in trying
to prevent financial cycles to be
consistent with the central bank's
mandate to achieve long-run price
stability.
SUMMARY
The 2002 Policy Forum
generated lively discussion among the
program speakers and audience
participants on a number of issues that
policymakers must confront in this
increasingly interdependent world.
Our hope is that the ideas raised will
spur further research and foster a
greater understanding of today's global
economy.
We will hold our third annual
Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum,
"Managing the Recovery in Uncertain
Times," on November 14, 2003. You
will find the agenda on page 17. B R